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quality improvement.  The policy implication here is Japan’s declining population can be compensated 
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    1.  Japan’s economic growth after the Second World War was miraculous.  Hundreds of 
economic studies have been done to analyze the high performance of the economy.  
Recently, however, attention has turned to worrisome expectations for the future: Will 
Japan’s population decline put an end to the country’s macroeconomic growth?  
     The United States also experienced a high growth rate after the Second World War.  
President Kennedy’s policies in the 1950’s supported economic growth through 
innovation.  The high growth was also backed by capital accumulation and population 
growth.  However, recent rapid population growth coming from the influx of immigrants 
to the United States has been followed by much ambivalence toward population growth; 
many worry about problems that may come from lack of assimilation and overpopulation.   
     There is no economic or popular consensus on whether population growth is good or 
bad for long-run economic growth.  This paper compares and contrasts the economies of 
Japan and the United States after the 1960’s using traditional or basic growth models.  
The elements of the analysis are GDP, capital, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP). 
This last element is comparable to the index of Hicks-neutral economic progress, which 
explains the total efficiency of capital and labor. 
     The novel contribution of this paper, accruing from those of Sato and Ramachandran 
(1987) and Sato (1970), is that we analyze not only how the TFP has increased or 
decreased, but also analyze separately the efficiency of capital and the efficiency of labor.  
The result of this analysis will allow us to make a policy proposal that in order to raise 
TFP growth, we have to consider how and how much the efficiency of either or both of 
capital and labor must be increased.  Merely knowing TFP is generally considered 
sufficient for economic analysis.  However, our comparison of the two countries will 
show that because each country’s composition of TFP is fundamentally different, 
knowing only total efficiency does not suffice. 
     In order to analyze the efficiency of capital and labor, we need to know the production 
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production function.  In general terms, elasticity of substitution is a technology index.  As 
Sato and Beckmann (1968) and Rose (1968) discovered, elasticity of substitution plays a 
critical role in the analysis of the efficiency of each input factor.  Our growth analysis uses 
the concept of elasticity of substitution and applies the concept to the data of the two 
countries. 
    2.  In this paper we contrast the difference in the economic structures of Japan and the 
United States (US) by comparing the rate of factor-augmenting technical progress.  Our 
investigation reveals that whether or not the capital and labor are efficiently used has a 
strong impact on economic growth.   
     Following the theoretical explanation in Section II, we conduct in Section III the 
estimations of the growth rate of biased technical change using both countries’ macro data 
from 1960 to 2004.  The data are then divided into two periods—Period I (1960–1989) 
and Period II (1990–2004)—because the analysis of Period II is particularly useful in 
highlighting the characteristics of each economy.  Period II for Japan includes the "lost 
decade," the period of long-lasting stagnation after the burst of the asset price bubble
1, 
while the same period of time for the US is often described as the "new economy," whose 
rapid growth was driven by newly developed industries such as IT and biotechnology. 
     In Subsection III-1, we determine that we can apply the model of factor-augmenting 
(biased) technical change to the Japanese and US economies.  We find this by testing to 
confirm that the production functions in both countries are not Cobb-Douglas, and the 
technical progress in both countries is not Hicks-neutral.  In Subsection III-2, we estimate 
the production functions with biased technical change.  During the estimation process, we 
compare the 44 years’ performance of each economy.  The simulation results using the 
estimated production functions are shown in the next subsection.  In Subsection III-4, we 
                                                        
1 Many scholars and economists have attempted to analyze Japan's lost decade using TFP.  Recognized 
contributions include an industry-level research of TFP by Fukao and Kwon (2006) and a TFP analysis 
focusing on information technology by Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005). 
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estimation results explain how Japan's high growth was sustained by the efficiency of 
labor.  Subsection III-5 shows that Japan responded to external shocks such as oil crises 
more flexibly than the US did.  Then, in Subsection III-6, we present another way to 
contrast the two countries by applying the stability condition theoretically explained in 
subsection II-3.  We found that although the economic growth in the US may have been at 
the steady state, the growth in Japan has not yet neared the steady state. 
     It turned out that broadly defined innovation has been and will be the engine of the 
growth of the Japanese economy.  Japan does not have to be pessimistic about the 
declining birth rate because value-added of labor can compensate for the decline.   
 
II.   A Model of Biased (Labor-Saving) Technical Change 
    3.  Consider an aggregative economy where at each year t, one output (Y(t)) is 
produced by two factor inputs, capital (K(t)) and labor (L(t)), under the neo-classical 
constant returns to scale technology.  Production of Y(t) depends also on the general 
technical change (T(t)).  Then the production function takes the form,  
  [ ] () () , () , () Yt FKt Lt Tt =  [1] 
where F satisfies the usual regularity conditions.   
    For the purpose of empirical analysis, it is convenient to study a special case of 
equation [1], where technical change is of the factor-augmenting type (or 
Sato-Beckman-Rose neutral type)
2.  Thus, equation [1] takes the form  
  [ ] () () () , () () () , () Yt FAtKt BtLt F Kt Lt ⎡ ⎤ == ⎣ ⎦, [2] 
where A(t) and B(t) are efficiencies of capital and labor respectively; and  () Kt= A(t)K(t) 
and  () Lt= B(t)L(t) or the effective capital and the effective labor.  Notice that T(t) in 
equation [1] is divided up into A(t) and B(t) in [2].  Thus when A(t)≡B(t) T(t),  equation  ≡
                                                        
2 See Sato and Beckman (1968) and Rose (1968) for the condition for the factor-augmenting technical 
change. 
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A(t) 1 B(t) T(t), it is reduced to the Harrod-neutral type and when  
A(t) T(t) B(t) 1 it is reduced to the Solow-Ranis-Fei type.  Because equation 
≡ ≠ ≡
≡ ≠ ≡ [1] is a 
linear homogeneous production function, under the Hicks-neutral case equation [2] can 
be rewritten as, 
  [ ] () () () , () Yt TtFKt Lt = ; [3] 
under the Harrod-neutral case as  
  [ ] () () , () () () , () Yt FKt TtLt F Kt Lt ⎡ ⎤ == ⎣ ⎦ ,  T(t) = B(t); [4] 
and under the Solow-Ranis-Fei neutral case as 
  [ ] () () () , () () , () Yt FTtKt Lt F Kt Lt ⎡ ⎤ == ⎣ ⎦ ,  T(t) = A(t). [5] 
 
II-1.  Importance of the Elasticity of Factor Substitution 
    4. There are three reasons that the elasticity of substitution σ (t) plays a crucial role in 
the analysis of the factor-augmenting type of technical progress. 
     The first reason comes from the underlying invariance or neutrality theorem.
3  The 
factor-augmenting (biased) type of technical change [2] is theoretically justified by an 
invariant condition.  That is to say, equation [2] is a result of derivation of the production 
function under the invariant condition that "inventions are neutral in the sense that the 
elasticity of substitution σ (t) remains unchanged (or invariant) before and after 
inventions as long as the relative income shares of factor inputs, α (t) for capital and  β (t) 
= 1-α (t) for labor, are unaffected or vice versa". 
    This is a direct contrast to the case of "Hicks-neutral," where the invariance condition 
does not depend on the elasticity of the substitution concept.  The Hicks-neutral case is 
the result of the invariance (or neutrality) condition that "inventions are neutral in the 
sense that the relative income shares are not affected before and after inventions as long 
as the capital-labor ratio remains constant." 
                                                        
3 See Sato and Beckman (1968) for the invariant conditions for various types of production functions. 
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analysis of the factor-augmenting type of technical progress is that once σ (t) is known, 
one can derive (or integrate) the underlying production function F. 
     If one attempts to estimate A(t) and B(t) using empirical data, one will confront the 
situation where the elasticity of factor substitution σ (t) must be predetermined.  This is 




































 ⎠ , [7] 
where dot = Newton's time derivative, r(t) = return to capital, and w(t) = wage rate of 
labor.
4  
     Where σ (t) is known, the elasticity of substitution σ (t) can be looked at as a second 
order (non-linear) differential equation whose solution is the production function.  The 
relationship between σ (t) and F is shown by the solution, 
  ()
()
() ( () ) () e x p l o g
Ctx
yA t f C t x A t G μ μ == ∫ ∂ , ([36] in Appendix) 
  where  y = Y/K and x = 1/k = L/K, μ = C(t)ν 
so that 
  [ ] () () () , () () () , () Yt FAtKt BtLt F Kt Lt ⎡ ⎤ == ⎣ ⎦.
5 [8] 
     Thus, once σ (t) is known, one can derive  [ ] () () , () () FAtKt BtLt  using equations [6], 
[7], and [8] simultaneously.  In Section III, we do this using the US and Japanese data. 
     5.  The third reason why the elasticity of substitution σ (t) plays a crucial role is that 
technical change can be classified as biased (or non-neutral) in the sense of Hicks (at the 
                                                        
4 These equations are derived in Sato (1970). 
5 In Appendix VI-1, we show the process to obtain equation [8], which originated with Sato and 
Beckman (1968). 
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      As Sato (1970) shows, if we define marginal rate of substitution ω as  / rw ω =  and k 








⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =− = − − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
    
. [9] 
Using equation [9], one can classify various cases as modeled in Hicks (1966).  He 
defines “labor-saving” inventions as those whose initial effects are to increase the ratio of 
the marginal product of capital to that of labor (at constant capital-labor ratio).  Such 
inventions increase the marginal product of capital more than they increase the marginal 
product of labor, thus raising the relative share of capital and reducing the relative share 
of labor. We classify technical change into several cases, as summarized below. 
(1) Labor-saving: 
      (a)   When the elasticity of substitution is less than unity,  () 1 t σ < , and the efficiency 
of labor increases faster than that of capital, i.e., B B   >  AA  at the constant 
capital-labor ratio, technical change is labor-saving. 
      (b)   When σ (t) is greater than unity,  () 1 t σ > , and  AA   > B B   at the constant 
capital-labor ratio, technical change is labor-saving. 
(2) Capital-saving: 
 When  () 1 t σ < ,  AA   > B B   or  () 1 t σ > , and B B   >  AA   at  () () Kt Lt = 
constant, technical change is capital-saving. 
(3) Hicks-neutral: 
 When  AA BB ≡    under  () () Kt Lt = constant, technical change is 
Hicks-neutral, regardless of whether σ (t) is greater than (or less than) unity. 
(4) When σ (t) =1, or the Cobb-Douglas case, any factor-augmenting type will appear as 
the Hicks-neutral case.  That is to say, one can not differentiate A(t) and B(t). 
We will present in Section III that both the Japanese and US economies’ technical 
progress since 1960 can be categorized into labor-saving technical progress. 
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(1) Theoretical inequality vs. empirical identity 
    6.  For the factor-augmenting type of production function [2], the growth rate of Y may 
be expressed as 
 
() () () () () () ()
() () () () () () ()
() () () () () () () ()
,
() () () () () () () ()
Yt Ft Kt Kt Ft Lt Lt
Yt Kt Yt Kt Lt Yt Lt
Ft Kt At Kt Ft Lt Bt Lt
Kt Yt At Kt Lt Yt Bt Lt
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂





























∂ ) , and 






L tB t L t
== . 
    To highlight the difference between the Hicks-neutral case and the general 
factor-augmenting (biased) case, we may denote the relative shares of capital and labor 
as:   ( ()
B kt α )  and  ( ) ()
B kt β  for the general factor-augmenting type, and   and  ( ()
N kt α )
( ) ()
N kt β  for the Hicks-neutral case.   
    Using these definitions, equation [10] may be written as: 
      () () () ()
() () () () ()
() () () ()
() () () () ()
BBB B Yt At Bt Kt Lt
kt kt kt kt
Yt At Bt Kt Lt
αβαβ =+++
   
   [10′] 
for the factor-augmenting type, and 
  () ()
() () () ()
() ()
() () () ()
NN Yt Tt Kt Lt
kt kt




for the Hicks-neutral case, where A(t) ≡ B(t) ≡ T(t) and  [ ] () () () , () Yt TtFKt Lt = .   
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() () () () ()
() () () ()
() () () () ()
BB B B A tB t Y t K t
kt kt kt kt
L t
A tB t Y t K tL
αβ αβ
⎛⎞
+= − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠




            () ()
() () () ()
() ()
() () () ()
NN Tt Yt Kt Lt
kt kt







Unless  A(t) ≡ B(t) ≡ T(t), we have  ( ) ( ) () ()
BN kt kt αα ≠  and  ( ) () () ()
BN kt kt ββ ≠ .  
Hence we have “theoretical inequality” between equations [11] and [12]. 
     7.  Equations [11] and [12] are also linked by an important statistical (or empirical) 
identity.  We have no a priori knowledge about the existence and magnitudes of A(t) and 
B(t).  This means that we have no a priori knowledge about whether or not capital’s 
income share (also labor’s income share) is affected by A(t) and B(t).  In other words, we 
cannot identify a priori whether the observed share of capital α is α
N or α
B, and whether 
that of β is β
N or β
B . 
     In working with the empirical estimation of  () () Tt Tt   using the Solow-Kendrick 
method (equation [12]), one may be, in effect, estimating equation [11].  Thus equations 
[11] and [12] may coincide with each other.  Hence, the estimated value of  () () Tt Tt  , 
estimated () () Tt Tt  by equation [11] must be identical with the estimated value of the 
weighted sum of  () () At At   and  () () B tB t  , weights given by the relative income shares, 
which are affected by A(t) and B(t), or by  () () () () () kt A tKt BtLt = .  Hence, 











We shall call equation [13] the “empirical identity.”  This states that the percentage 
change of the estimated Hicks-neutral technical change factor or TFP is always equal to 
the weighted sum of the percentage changes of the biased technical change factors, where 
the weights are given by their observed relative income shares. 
 
(2) More than total productivity 
    8. One might argue that as long as we know  () () Tt Tt  , we do not have to be bothered 
with the relative efficiencies of capital and labor,  AA   and B B  .  Nevertheless, the 
  Preliminary, March 2007  12relative efficiencies are exactly the point.  There may be an infinitely large number of 
different combinations between  AA   and B B   that satisfy equation [12].  For example, 
AA   can and may be negative, while B B   may be positive and large, so that  () () Tt Tt   
can still be positive.  (See Subsection III-4 for the Japanese estimate.) 
     A negative  AA   value has a profound implication in terms of R&D or innovation 
policy.  This is the reason why we need the analysis of biased technical change.  
Estimating only TFP does not give the full story behind the country's economic 
performance and productivity growth. 
 
II-3.  Equilibrium Growth and Stability under Biased Technical Change  
    9. In this subsection, succeeding the theoretical framework of Sato (2006), we present 
the equilibrium growth rate and stability condition for the economy with biased technical 
change.   
     Let  [ ] () () , () Yt FKt Lt =  be the production function before technical change.  To 
distinguish the production function after the factor-augmenting type of technical change 
from the production function before the technical change, we may denote the function as 
() Yt so that 
  () () , () Yt FKt Lt ⎡ = ⎣⎤ ⎦ , [2"]   
where K (t) = A(t)K(t), L (t) = B(t)L(t), and Y (t) is output after technical change.  This 
equation can be viewed as the production function after K has been transformed to  K  and 
L to L .  To begin with the simplest case, it may be assumed that labor and its efficiency 
factor are both exogenously given as 
 
() d
dt BL LB L
bn
LB LB L
λ == + = +
 
= >0,   [14] 
where b = the growth rate of labor-augmenting technical change and n = the growth rate 
of labor.   
     Assume K   is endogenously determined by 
  ()
d
dt KA K s ==  Y ,     1 > s > 0   
  Preliminary, March 2007  13where s is a fraction of output (or income) Y used to create additional effective capital. 
    If we define output by effective capital as  y YK YA K == , then by dividing K   by 
K , and using Ks Y =  , we get 
 













L tB t L t
== ,  












⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =− =− = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
 
−
  [16] 


















Because  () 1 df d k ( = the marginal product of effective labor) is always positive, the 
above is always satisfied.  Thus, a balanced path is stable under the endogenous 
factor-augmenting type of technical change.   
     Whenever kk  is positive, k must be increasing, whereas whenever kk   is negative, 
k must be decreasing.  When k =k *, kk  =0, which implies that sf must be exactly 
equal to λ .  At k =k *, the growth rate of effective capital is identical to the growth rate 
of effective labor, i.e., KK LL =  . 
    10. This stability condition can also be applied when the efficiency improvement of 
labor depends on the amount of expenditure devoted to education and training.  Then 











  Preliminary, March 2007  14Labor efficiency now depends on the amount of money spent for improvement purposes.  
It is determined by a fraction (sB) of income per labor measured in its efficiency unit.  




1, , 1 , where
B
B
sY kK Ls Y
n
kK LK L







 1  >  s+sB > 0.   










− .  
The stability condition is satisfied if 











     The first term sd f d k ⋅  is negative (see equation [17]).  The second term is always 
positive because dg dk  is the marginal product of effective capital.  Hence equation [18] 
is automatically satisfied.  Introducing endogenous labor-augmentation makes the system 
more stable. 




















At steady-state k =k *, () ( )
**
KK LL =   holds.  Because α +β =1, if we put 
() (
**
KK LL =  ) = G












such that  










*     [20] 
 is the condition for the stable growth.  In Subsection III-6, we examine the economies of 
Japan and the United States to see whether they satisfy this condition. 
 
 
III.   Applications to the US and Japanese Data 
 
III-1.  Tests of Non-Unity of σ 
    12.  Before we conduct the estimation of biased technical progress, we must ensure that 
the production functions are not Cobb-Douglas. If the function is Cobb-Douglas, there is 
no way to separate A and B.  Also, we have to determine whether technical progress is 
Hicks-neutral. If it is so, A should always be equal to B, which means we have no need to 
estimate the biased technical growth. 
    To determine whether the production functions are Cobb-Douglas, we first use test 1: 
average elasticity of substitution method. We then apply test 2: the Hicks-neutrality test to 
examine the fitness of the data of both countries. 
 
(1) Test 1:  Average elasticity of substitution method 
    13.  This is a test introduced by Sato (1970: 192-193) to identify whether the 
production function of each country is Cobb-Douglas type.  Define z = Y/L, x = L/K and 














Also, define R(y/r) as the ratio of  yy   to rr  , and R(x/ω) as the ratio of  x x   to ω ω  .  
Then,  




























     If σ = 1, then  R(z/w), R(y/r), and R(x/ω) should be, on the average, the same and equal 





⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ == ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
= , [24] 
where the upper-bar indicates the average value of R's.  Therefore, equation [24] may be 
used as a test of the Cobb-Douglas function.   
    The average values calculated are presented in Table 1. 
    In both countries' cases, the three variables are very different from one another and 
equation [24] does not hold.  Therefore, we can conclude σ  is not unity, which means that 
the production functions of both countries are not Cobb-Douglas.   
 
 
Table 1.  Average Elasticity of Substitution Method Results 
1.0366 0.7178
(0.9358 ) (1.6730 )
0.6831 0.5133
(0.8642 ) (1.4028 )
0.6445 0.4687
(0.9227 ) (2.4109 )





Notes:  Standard Deviation is in parenthesis.  In the US case, extreme 4 data are excluded 
from R(z/w), 1 and 2 data are excluded from R(y/r) and R(x/ω) respectively. 
 
 
(2) Test 2:  Test of Hicks-neutrality  
    14.  Next we determine whether the technical progress is Hicks-neutral.  When 
technical progress is biased, the following fundamental equations hold
6. 
                                                        
6 See Sato (1970: 183) for the discussion on these fundamental relations. 
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   
⎟ , [26] 
where k = 1/x = K/L. 

















,   [26'] 
where TT AA BB ==   . In this case the two regressional estimates of TT  , which are 
between ww   and kk  , and between rr   and kk  , should be equal. Results are in Table 
2. 
Table 2.  The Hicks-Neutrality Test Results 
 Japan  United  States 
AverageTT       2.10%     1.06% 
α  0.2934 0.3133 















Estimated TT  = －0.86% 










Estimated TT  = 1.39% 












Estimated TT  = 0.19% 











Estimated TT  = 2.18% 
Estimated σ  = 0.6064 
    In both countries’ cases, the coefficients of determinations are very low, except for 
Japan’s ww  ; TT   obtained from the two equations for each country are very different.  
Thus, these results suggest that technical progress is nonneutral.  We are now ready to 
estimate production functions with biased technical change. 
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    15.  We take four steps in the estimation of the production functions with biased 
technical change for Japan and the United States.  We should note here that there are 
always inevitable limitations in the application of the theory.  In our case, all the 
theoretical equations are time continuous, while actual data are discrete (in our case, 
annual).  Thus, we should approximate the derivatives by the difference.  To do so, for a 
year t, we substitute the growth rate  () () Yt Yt   for  () () Yt Yt Δ =( ) ( 1 )( )( Yt Yt Yt +− ) .  In 
the remainder of this paper, we continue to use the derivatives even in the application, for 
the sake of simplicity. 
 
(1) Estimation of Hicks-neutral technical progress 
     As discussed in Section II, we need to know the elasticity of substitution, σ(t), in 
advance of estimating the growth rate of biased technical progress  AA   and B B  .  For 
the purpose of finding out the elasticity, we first derive Solow-Kendrick TFP for each 
country. 
    The production function with Hicks-neutral technical progress should take the form of 
equation [3].  As we have observed, with the share of capital α (t) = r(t)K(t) / Y(t) and that 
of labor β (t)= w(t)L(t) / Y(t),  the growth rate of Y is expressed as 
 
() () () ()
() ()
() () () ()
Yt Tt Kt Lt
tt




    If we further define  , so that    
, then, by rearranging equation 
/, / zY L kK L == /// zz YY LL =−  











     With the data divided by time period into Period I (1960–1989) and Period II 
(1990–2004), the period averages of observed relative share of factor inputs used in 
equation [28] are shown in Table 3.  The period averages of estimated  () () Tt Tt  are 
shown in Table 4, together with other variables.  The period averages for the period  
  Preliminary, March 2007  19t = [0, S] are calculated as () ( ) ( ) 0 1( )
S
t AVG TT S Tt Tt = = ∑  ( ) .   
 
Table 3.  Average Relative Share of Input Factors 
1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004 1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004
Average Relative Share of Capita α 29.34% 31.60% 24.82% 31.33% 30.80% 32.39%
Average Relative Share of Labor β 70.66% 68.40% 75.17% 68.67% 69.20% 67.61%




Table 4.  Growth Rate of Hicks-Neutral Technical Change and Other Factors 
1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004 1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004
Growth Rate of Output 4.65% 6.35% 1.03% 3.08% 3.05% 3.13%
Growth Rate of
Hicks Neutral Technical Change 2.13% 2.91% 0.45% 1.07% 0.90% 1.43%
Growth Rate of Capital 7.32% 9.25% 3.18% 3.31% 3.58% 2.72%
Growth Rate of Labor 0.28% 0.56% -0.31% 1.39% 1.49% 1.19%






z z   
 
    16.  Given these results, we take a bird’s eye view to compare the performance over 44 
years of the economies of Japan and the US.  From 1960 through 2004, the average 
annual growth rate  for Japan was 4.65%, while that for the US was 3.08%.  In the 
same period, the labor increased only 0.28% per annum in Japan, while it increased 
1.39% in the US.   
/ YY 
     The Japanese economy grew much faster with a much lower growth rate of labor.  
From Table 5, we can learn that in Japan, the relative contribution of labor 
( ) ( ) ( ) / LL Y Y β ⋅   was just 4.30% of total GDP growth.  Although it turned negative in 
Period II, this downturn may have been caused not by population decline but by the lack 
of effective demand.  In lieu of labor contribution, the increase of capital KK   and 
technical progress TT   supported high economic growth.  Capital contributed as much 
as 46.14% to the GDP growth, and technical progress contributed nearly as much 
(45.76%).  Actually, Japan's capital increase (annually 7.32%) was more than twice that 
  Preliminary, March 2007  20of the US (annually 3.31%).  The rate of Hicks-neutral technical change was 2.13% per 
annum, also nearly double that of the US (1.07%).  We found that the engines of Japanese 
economic growth were booming capital investment and properly combined technical 
progress of capital and labor.  
 
Table 5.  Relative Contributions to Economic Growth by Technical Change and Factor Inputs 
1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004 1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004
45.76% 45.87% 44.30% 34.80% 29.58% 45.69%
46.14% 46.05% 76.90% 33.65% 36.11% 28.15%
4.30% 6.03% -22.60% 31.09% 33.73% 25.71%
Statistical Adjustment 3.80% 2.05% 1.41% 0.46% 0.58% 0.45%




















Notes:  To apply actual data to the theory, we have to approximate differentiation by difference.  Thus the weighted 
sum of the increase of each factor is not equal to the growth rate.  We show the discrepancy as "Statistical 
Adjustment" 
 
    These results indicate that the source of Japan's economic growth was quality 
improvement—rather than quantity increase—of population and labor force.  In contrast, 
the source of economic growth for the US was quantity increase—rather than quality 
improvement—of population and labor force.  The growth rate of output per unit of labor 
z z   was only four-tenths that of Japan (Table 1).  The US economic growth was 
sustained by technical progress and the increase of the labor force. 
     We should note that in the United States, the relative contributions to economic growth 
of technical progress, capital increase, and labor increase are balanced.  The contribution 
rates are 34.8%, 33.65% and 31.09%, respectively.  Discussion on this balanced growth 
appears in Subsection III-6.  In a country blessed with abundant land and natural 
resources, population increase played a major role in the US economic growth.  
Population increase made economic expansion possible without much improvement in 
  Preliminary, March 2007  21the efficiency of factors.   
(2) Deriving average elasticity of substitution σ
N 
    17.  Next, we estimate average elasticity of substitution under the assumption of 
Hicks-neutral technical progress, σ
N.   
    For a year t, σ
N is estimated using 
 
() () () ()
() () () () ()
() () () ()
() () () ()
N
Kt Kt Kt Lt d
Lt Lt Kt Lt t
wt rt wt wt























N . [29] 
Some of the 
N
t σ s give extraordinarily high or negative values. Since σ in developed 
countries are known to range 0 < σ < 1, we excluded negatives and those over one from 
the summation in equation [29]. 
     The estimated σ
N for Japan from 1960 to 2004 is 0.57.  In Period I only it is 0.63, and 
in Period II only it is 0.50.  For the United States, the average elasticity of substitution for 
these periods is 0.46, 0.51, and 0.38, respectively.  The results are also appear later in 
Table 6 (Subsection III-3). 
 
(3) Estimation of CES functions with Hicks-neutral technical change 
    18.  Since we discovered production functions in both countries are not Cobb-Douglas 
type and there are no trends of σ correlating with the values k or time t, we assume the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function and identify how σ
N  fits the 
actual data.  Before we directly estimate the production function with factor-augmenting 
(biased) technical change, we estimate the function with Hicks-neutral technical change 
in order to make a comparison. 
     With Hicks-neutral technical change, the function should take the form of 
 
1/
() () () ()
N




−− ⎡ =+ ⎣
⎤
⎦ , [30] 
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N  =1/(1+ρ
N) .  T(t) is assumed to grow at a constant rate during a period, which is 
given as the average of each  () () Tt Tt   estimated in .  We also assume Cobb-Douglas α 
and β are constant throughout the period, and we apply period averages of observed α and 
β. 
 
(4) Estimation of CES functions with factor-augmenting technical change 
     We are now ready to estimate the CES function with factor-augmenting (biased)  
technical change.  We substitute the estimates of elasticity σ
N into equations [6] and [7] to 
derive  AA   and B B  .  Theoretically, the elasticity of substitution of factor-augmenting 
technical change has to be stated as equation [31] because when technical progress is 
nonneutral, the value of the elasticity itself is influenced by the efficiencies of capital and 
labor.
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. [31] 
     In view of the fact that we cannot observe σ
B directly, we use σ
N instead.  As presented 
in Appendix (VI-3), in the simulation of Y
B(t), variational changes of σ around σ
N do not 
give significant deviation to their results.  Thus, σ
N qualifies to be the proxy of σ
B. 
    Then, the CES function takes the form of 
  () ( )
1/
() () () () ()
N
N




−− ⎡ =+ ⎢ ⎣
ρ ⎤
⎥ ⎦
                                                       
. [32] 
Estimated Y
B(t) summarizes our model.  It represents both the form of the production 
function and the biasedness of technical change.  






7 See Sato (1970) for detailed discussion on the elasticity of substitution of factor-augmenting 
technical change. 
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III-3.  Simulation Results 
    19. Equipped with average σ
N  ,  AA  , andB B   (shown in Table 6 in Subsection III-4), 
we estimated Y
N and Y
B .  CES production functions with Hicks-neutral technical change 
Y
N are plotted with thick gray lines in Figures 1 and 2.  As our tests have suggested, the 
technical progress in both countries may not be Hicks-neutral. Hence, Y
N deviates far 
from actual Y.  Hicks-neutral technical change assumes the rate of the efficiency of capital 
and labor changing at equal rates, which is not true for Japan and the US. 
     As for the estimated CES production functions with biased technical change Y
B, shown 
by thin lines with markers in Figures 1 and 2, they all fit much better than do Y
N.  This 
supports our view that the economies of Japan and the United States both experienced 
biased technical growth.  Also, it suggests that estimation of TFP does not suffice to 
diagnose the economic performance and to prescribe any policy for either of these 
countries. 
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Figure 1.  Estimated Output of Japan  
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Figure 2.  Estimated Output of the United States 
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  Preliminary, March 2007  26III-4.  Biased Technical Change of Japan and the United States 
    20.  As our neutrality tests and simulation results suggested, the estimation with neutral 
technical change lacks the ability to explain the actual economic growth.  Conversely, the 
factor-augmenting (biased) technical change explains further the characteristics of each 
economy.  Once we know the growth rate of efficiency of each factor ( AA   and B B  ), 
we are able to more adequately tailor policies to raise the total efficiency (TT  ).    
     Tables 6 and 7 summarize the average growth of efficiency of factors.  Both countries’ 
σ
  is less than one, and  AA   is smaller thanB B   in all periods.  According to the 
definition in Subsection II-1, both countries experienced labor-saving technical progress.   
     In Japan, labor-saving technical progress helped the economic growth despite labor 
itself declining.  Japan’s labor-saving technical progress offset the low labor increase.  
The growth rate of labor efficiency B B   in Japan for 44 years was annually 3.86%, a 
figure more than double that of the US (1.74%).   This labor efficiency sustained Japan’s 
high growth.  The Japanese economy developed without depending too much on its 
population growth.   
     Another fact revealed in the analysis on biased technical change is that Japan 
experienced over investment.  As implied in the economic conservation law
8, overly 
rapid capital accumulation lowers the efficiency of capital.  This mainly happened in 
Period I, when the growth rate of capital was as high as 9.25%.  As we will argue in 
Subsection III-6, the income/capital ratio in Japan was much higher than it needed to be to 
ensure Japan’s stable growth. 
    21. Now we focus on Period II (1990–2004), which includes the Japan’s lost decade 
and the United States’ new economy.  As is well known, the growth rate of US surpassed 
that of Japan in Period II.  In Japan, the growth rate of GDP, labor, and labor efficiency all 
declined in Period II compared to the rates in Period I.  The growth rate of labor efficiency 
slowed to 1.01% from 5.11% in Period I.  This 4.1 percentage point decline was much 
                                                        
8 The income-capital conservation law is summarized in Sato (1985). 
  Preliminary, March 2007  27larger than that of labor (a decline of 0.87 points, to -0.31 % from 0.56%.)  
     Capital efficiency continuously decreased during 1960–2004, although in Period II it 
showed a scant 0.27 point improvement to -1.36% from -1.63%.  This fact indicates that 
Japan’s lost decade suffered from over investment and consecutive accumulation of bad 
loans.  To raise total productivity, Japan needs to turn the capital efficiency toward the 
positive, as was done in the US, and it needs to raise labor efficiency to a greater extent. 
    In the United States, capital efficiency turned moderately positive in Period II to 0.08% 
from -0.59%.  Capital efficiency growth is very close to zero, so we can assume 
Harrod-neutral growth for the US economy.  
     The idea of biased technical change itself is not new, but not many applications have 
been done so far.  Our findings revealed that analyzing only TFP or Hicks-neutral 
technical change is not sufficient as a basis for evaluating the economic performance of 
Japan and the United States. 
 
Table 6.  Growth Rate of Biased Technical Change 
1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004 1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004
Growth Rate of
Hicks Neutral Technical Change 2.13% 2.91% 0.45% 1.07% 0.90% 1.43%
Estimated
Elastisity of Substitution 0.57 0.63 0.50 0.46 0.51 0.38
Growth Rate of Capital Efficiency - 1.61% -1.63% -1.36% -0.41% -0.59% 0.08%






B B   
 
 
Table 7.  Relative Contributions of Hicks-Neutral Technical Change by Biased Technical 
Change 
1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004 1960-2004  1960-1989 1990-2004
-22.18% -17.67% -74.09% -11.96% -20.18% 1.86%
128.14% 119.97% 167.09% 111.44% 119.80% 92.95%
Statistical Adjustment -5.95% -2.30% 7.00% 0.52% 0.38% 5.19%

















  Preliminary, March 2007  28III-5.  Contrast in Response to Oil Crises 
    22. In this subsection, we contrast the economic response of the two countries toward 
external shocks, i.e., the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979.  If it were not for deflationary 
pressures in Japan and the US, the recent hike in oil price would have caused another 
crisis.  Looking ahead, due to complex international relationships around the Middle 
Eastern countries and policy changes in oil-producing South American countries, the 
worldwide crude oil supply could face shortages at any time.  It is worth examining the 
response toward past price shocks. 
   The two oil crises affected both countries.  We assume the time-lags of the shocks were 
the same to both countries, and compare the total data (with the oil crisis periods 
included) to the data with those years excluded (the years during lagged shocks are 
chosen as 1974–75 and 1980–82.)  By this comparison, we can see how the two countries 
responded to the shocks in different ways.  Table 8 lists the technical progress in each year 
with the averages for all years and for those excluding 1974–75 and 1980–82.  Table 9 
shows the average growth rates of other factors, also excluding those periods. 
    The Japanese response toward oil crises was superior to that of the United States.  
Especially in 1974 and 1975, Japan’s growth rates of capital efficiency were considerably 
positive, which means that Japan overcame the price pressures by substituting capital for 
energy.  Energy saving measures were developed quickly enough in Japan, an 
energy-scarce country.  This did not happen in the United States, an energy-abundant 
country, where both factor efficiencies declined after the crises. 
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Table 8.  Technical Progress with and without Oil Crises 
Rates of Technical Change
Average -1.61% 3.86% 2.13% -0.41% 1.74% 1.07%
Average excluding
1974-75,1980-82 -1.97% 4.39% 2.34% 0.10% 1.94% 1.36%
1961 -4.80% 14.24% 7.07% -0.91% 3.18% 1.90%
1962 -0.16% 5.89% 3.81% 1.29% 4.20% 3.29%
1963 -0.75% 4.75% 3.02% 0.89% 2.60% 2.06%
1964 -1.31% 12.22% 7.45% 1.32% 4.09% 3.21%
1965 0.82% 1.77% 1.62% 0.48% 3.54% 2.56%
1966 -3.06% 9.32% 5.11% 1.46% 4.03% 3.22%
1967 -7.19% 13.13% 5.99% -0.44% 1.27% 0.74%
1968 -6.42% 15.32% 7.28% 1.20% 1.79% 1.64%
1969 -2.26% 13.44% 7.49% 1.91% -1.51% -0.41%
1970 -5.21% 12.19% 5.33% -5.10% 4.79% 1.75%
1971 -2.33% 0.80% -0.12% -0.56% -1.49% -1.17%
1972 -2.78% 8.01% 4.19% 0.98% 1.05% 1.03%
1973 0.99% 4.40% 3.29% 2.37% 1.49% 1.76%
1974* 5.44% -6.00% -1.43% -3.23% -2.15% -2.48%
1975* 3.65% -1.53% 0.31% -8.57% 3.90% 0.11%
1976 -0.14% 1.46% 1.16% 0.87% 1.91% 1.60%
1977 1.70% 2.05% 2.02% 0.08% 1.62% 1.16%
1978 -6.75% 5.84% 2.29% 0.46% 1.52% 1.19%
1979 -7.82% 6.33% 2.29% -1.12% -0.23% -0.51%
1980* -5.50% 4.01% 1.26% -3.22% -0.46% -1.33%
1981* 3.59% 0.15% 1.25% -3.21% 1.28% -0.11%
1982* -1.35% 2.08% 1.02% -3.74% -1.62% -2.29%
1983 0.62% -0.82% -0.29% -3.01% 3.80% 1.75%
1984 -1.74% 4.30% 2.50% 1.97% 1.80% 1.85%
1985 -9.77% 7.88% 2.90% -0.54% 1.94% 1.14%
1986 -2.76% 2.01% 0.52% -0.22% 0.78% 0.46%
1987 -0.57% 2.37% 1.54% 1.08% -0.02% 0.33%
1988 -0.99% 6.48% 4.14% 1.54% 1.89% 1.78%
1989 0.96% 2.44% 1.98% -1.48% 1.43% 0.51%
1990 0.76% 2.74% 2.36% 0.13% 0.42% 0.34%
1991 2.74% 2.15% 2.28% -2.63% 0.41% -0.57%
1992 -2.04% 1.69% 0.82% 0.16% 2.04% 1.46%
1993 2.24% -0.73% 0.19% -0.34% 1.35% 0.82%
1994 1.48% -0.93% -0.27% -1.19% 3.57% 2.09%
1995 0.94% 0.02% 0.27% 0.04% 0.19% 0.14%
1996 -4.28% 3.81% 1.82% -1.34% 4.06% 2.27%
1997 -0.13% 0.86% 0.62% 0.85% 2.21% 1.75%
1998 -1.18% -0.18% -0.41% 4.15% 0.09% 1.49%
1999 -0.45% -1.03% -0.88% 2.18% 1.43% 1.69%
2000 0.95% 0.17% 0.36% 3.31% 1.01% 1.81%
2001 2.25% -0.35% 0.30% -2.14% 1.63% 0.41%
2002 -3.28% 0.73% -0.19% -1.58% 2.78% 1.38%
2003 -1.24% 1.14% 0.60% -1.36% 4.45% 2.57%




AA  AA  BB  BB 
N
AVG σ
TT  TT 
 
Notes:  The  A A   and  B B   presented here are calculated from the σ
N for each country.  We have also calculated the 
A A   and  B B   from various values of σ.  Interested readers may get the results upon request. 
  Preliminary, March 2007  30Table 9.  Average Growth Rates with and without Oil Crises 
1960-2004 1960-2004 
Growth Rate of Output 4.65% 3.08%
Growth Rate of
Hicks Neutral Technical Change 2.13% 1.07%
Growth Rate of Capital 7.32% 3.31%
Growth Rate of Labor 0.28% 1.39%
Growth Rate of Output Per Labor 4.35% 1.66%
Growth Rate of Capital Efficiency - 1.61% -0.41%

























B B   
  Notes: The years excluded are 1974–75 and 1980–82. 
 
    Needless to say, if the efficiency of factors had not dropped because of the crises, both 
economies would have grown faster.  The estimation of the efficiencies without the 
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Figure 3.  Performance Excluding the Effect of Oil Crises 
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  Preliminary, March 2007  32III-6.  Economic Performance Revisited 
    23. In this subsection, we test the equilibrium condition derived in Subsection II-3 to 
determine each economy’s performance.  
     For simplicity, we take three average growth rates, that of Period I (1960–1989), 
Period II (1990–2004) and the whole period (1960–2004), noted by i = 1, 2, and W, 
respectively.   































In each period, there exists steady-state growth rate Gi
* that satisfies equation [20], and 




i y YK YA K ==
 for each si.   
    In Japan,  i y  is much higher than 
*
i y .  Japanese capital stock has grown very fast, but it 
was not utilized to increase the economy’s total income (GDP).  In Period I, especially 
before the first oil crisis in 1973, an extremely high rate of investment accumulated 
Japanese physical stock at a very rapid pace, which supported the country’s miraculous 
economic growth.  In Period II, the Japanese economic growth was still lower than the 
growth rate of effective capital, and had not reached its steady state (Figure 4, Panel 3.)  
We can find here that there was over investment that kept the return on investment very 
low.   
   As for the US,  i y  is very close to 
*
i y  in every panel of Figure 5, and the actual output in 
period i was just below the optimal output by effective capital.  The growth rate of 
effective capital and effective labor, and the economic growth rate were balanced in both 
Period I and Period II. 
     Figures 4 and 5 indicate that the US might already be at a steady-state growth rate, but 
Japan is not.   
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Figure 4.  Output-Effective Capital Ratio (Japan) 
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Figure 5.  Output-Effective Capital Ratio (United States)  
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    24. Population decline in Japan is becoming a major concern.  The declining birth rate 
together with the increase of people reaching retirement age will surely reduce the size of 
the workforce.  The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare estimated that the labor force 
would peak at 67.7 million in 2005 and decline to 63 million in 2025
9, which would mark 
a roughly 0.36% annual decline.  The Japanese government believes that the expected 
demographic change will undermine the fundamentals of Japan’s economy and society.  
Anticipating such a national crisis, the Basic Law on Measures for Society with 
Decreasing Birthrate was legislated
10.      
     As for the United States, the population has been steadily increasing.  After recording 
100 million in 1915, it doubled to 200 million in 1967.  The year 1967 was during the 
prosperous Johnson presidency and people welcomed the number.  Thirty-nine more 
years added another 100 million; the population amounted to 300 million in October 2006.  
Now, however, the mood regarding the growing population is not congratulatory.  One 
reason is the foreseen environmental problems congestion might provoke.  Another 
reason is the immigration issue—diverse views exist on the rising number of immigrants.  
The proportion of immigrants to the total population was just 4% in 1967, but it had 
increased to 12% by 2004.  About half of the newly added 100 million members of the 
population were Hispanic, an ethnic group whose ratio now outweighs that of African 
Americans.  The US Census Bureau estimates that the projected Hispanic population will 
reach 20% of the total US population by 2030
11.  Many worry about problems that may 
come from lack of assimilation. 
    25. In this paper we contrasted the difference of economic structure of Japan and the 
United States by comparing the rate of factor-augmenting technical progress.  Our 
                                                        
9 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Shousika Shakai Hakusho (White Paper on Declining Birth 
Rate Society) 2004, p. 77. 
10 Law No. 133 of July 30, 2003 
11 U.S. Census Beureau, 2004, "U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin," 
Table 1a. 
  Preliminary, March 2007  38investigation revealed that efficient utilization of capital and labor will affect economic 
growth.  We suggested growth policies tailored for each economy. 
     After the theoretical explanations in Section II, we conducted the estimation using 
both countries’ macro data.  The data were taken from 1960 to 2004 and then divided into 
two periods: Period I (1960–1989) and Period II (1990–2004).  Period II for Japan 
includes the lost decade, while that for the United States is often described as the new 
economy.  The analysis on Period II was particularly effective in highlighting the 
characteristics of each economy. 
    26.  In Subsection III-2, we compared the 44 years’ performance of each economy.  The 
Japanese economy grew much more strongly with much lower labor growth.  The high 
economic growth was supported by the increase of capital and technical progress.  We 
found that the engines of Japanese economic growth were booming capital investment 
and properly combined technical progress of capital efficiency and labor efficiency.    
     Concisely stated, the source of Japan’s economic growth was quality 
improvement—rather than quantity increase—of population and labor force.  In contrast, 
for the US, what supported its economic growth was quantity increase—rather than 
quality improvement—of population and labor force.  The growth rate of GDP per unit of 
labor was only 38% of that of Japan.  Economic growth in the US was sustained by 
technical progress and the increase of the labor force.  In a country blessed with abundant 
land and natural resources, population increase played a major role in US economic 
growth.  Population increase made economic expansion possible without much 
improvement in the efficiency of factors. 
    27.  In Subsection III-4, the economic performance of each economy during the 44 
years is further explained by factor-augmenting (biased) technical change, which divides 
the Hicks-neutral technical progress into the growth rates of capital efficiency and labor 
efficiency.  The Japanese economy developed without depending too much on its 
population growth.  We should note, however, negative capital efficiency indicates that 
  Preliminary, March 2007  39Japan accumulated capital too rapidly until it caused over investment.  On the contrary, 
the US capital efficiency was around zero while labor efficiency grew only modestly.   
    Focusing on Period II (1990–2004), with the Japanese economy taking a downturn, the 
growth rate of the US economy surpassed that of the Japanese economy.  In Japan, the 
growth rate of GDP, labor, and labor efficiency all declined compared to the rates in 
Period I.  The decline of the growth rate of labor efficiency was sharper than that of labor 
itself.  The capital efficiency was also decreasing.  These facts indicate that Japan's lost 
decade suffered from the resulting over investment and bad loans.  In contrast, the US 
capital efficiency turned positive in Period II. 
    28. Overall, we discovered that Japan's high growth in Period I was not so much due to 
the increase of the population, but to improved labor efficiency.  Japan's stagnation, too, 
was not explained by the population decrease or shortage of effective demands, but by the 
slowdown of the improvement of labor efficiency. 
     Concerning the macro economy, labor decline itself has not been a cause of problems 
in Japan.  More important was the fact that the burst of the bubble economy eroded firms' 
capacity to promote technical progress.  Technical progress here does not necessarily 
mean either development of IT-related technology or introduction of brand-new, 
innovative technology.
12  In our context, technical progress includes all ingenuity that can 
be used to improve the efficiency of capital and labor.   
     Broadly defined innovation has been and will be the engine of the development and 
growth of the Japanese economy.  Thus, Japan does not have to be pessimistic about the 
declining birth rate.
13 Value-added of labor can compensate for the decline in the 
workforce.  Innovation can be brought about by policies that encourage people’s 
motivations and expectations.   
                                                        
12 Basu and Fernald (2002) examine that the aggregate Solow residual (TFP) qualifies to be an index 
of welfare change as long as the economic profits are small. 
13 However, Japan’s social security system is in need of reform because it was originally designed with 
the premise that the country’s population would continuously grow.  We stress here that social security 
reform is a matter of great urgency. 
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VI-1.  Theoretical Justification of Production Function with Biased Technical 
Change 
    Sato and Beckmann (1968) precisely provide the theoretical justification of this 
production function.  They set general production function as Y = F[K, L], which is 
homogeneous of degree one, then under the condition that factor shares are invariant as 
long as σ remains constant, i.e., σ is a function of β only, they deduce the general 
production function which incorporates the above invariance condition. 
    Define  ,1 , kK L x kL K yY K == == , then  () yf x =  and  () YK f x = . 
In this case, marginal productivities are 
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    Since σ must be a function of β,  we define the function φ as (1/σ) = φ(β).  Therefore, 
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Solving and integrating equation [34] makes 
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β . [35] 
Here, logC(t) is the arbitrary constant arising from integrating  x x ∂ , which measures the 
technical progress factor. 
    From equation [35], we can derive β as a function of C(t)x as () () x xyyG C t x β == . 
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where A(t) is the arbitrary constant arising from integrating  yy ∂ , which satisfies C(t) = 
B(t)/A(t). 
Substituting C(t)v = μ, the above can be simplified as 
  ()
()
() e x p l o g
Ctx
yA t G μ μ = ∫ ∂ , [36] 
where the integration is carried out at constant t, 
  ( ) () () yA t f C t x = . [37] 
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type of technical progress. 
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VI-2.  Data 
To complete the historical data, we take data of 1960–1990 from Sato, et al. (1999), which 
is derived from OECD statistics.  After 1991, we adjusted the data for the relevant 
variables using different sources listed below.: 
 
Japan 
Y:  Real Gross Domestic Products excluding Government Consumption  
  (SourceOECD National Accounts Database, OECD, 
http://new.sourceoecd.org/vl=1563494/cl=22/nw=1/rpsv/home.htm). 
K:  Real Private Capital Stock  
  (Annual Report on Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises, Systems of National 
Accounts, Cabinet Office Homepage, Japan, 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/toukei.html#s-kakuho) 
L:  Labor Force  
  (Labor Force Survey, SourceOECD Main Economic Indicators, OECD, 
http://new.sourceoecd.org/vl=1563494/cl=22/nw=1/rpsv/home.htm)  
  multiplied by  
  Hours worked per worker  
 (Systems  of  National  Accounts,  Cabinet Office Homepage, Japan, 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/toukei.html#s-kakuho) 
w:  Real Compensation of Employees (SourceOECD National Accounts Database, 
OECD, http://new.sourceoecd.org/vl=1563494/cl=22/nw=1/rpsv/home.htm)  
 divided  by   
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Y:  Real Gross Domestic Products of Private Sector  
  (National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asp). 
K:  Real Private Fixed Assets  
  (Fixed Asset Tables, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/SelectTable.asp#S6) 
L:  Total Hours Worked, Private  
  (National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asp) 
w:  Real Compensation of Employees (SourceOECD National Accounts Database, 
OECD, http://new.sourceoecd.org/vl=1563494/cl=22/nw=1/rpsv/home.htm)  
 divided  by   





VI-3.  Simulation Results for Different Values of σ 
    Because no methods exists for identifying the exact value of σ under the biased 
technical change (Impossibility Theorem, see Sato (1970)), we experimented with 
conducting simulation with different values of σ in the neighborhood of the value 
corresponding to the assumed case of Hicks-neutral type σ
N (Y
N). 
     As shown in Figures 6 and 7, the results are encouraging in the sense that the variations 
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Figure 6  Simulation Path Using the σ around σ
N (Japan) 
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Figure 7  Simulation Path Using the σ around σ
N (United States)  
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